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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze stock-flow adjustments of creative
accounting in Japanese municipalities after the introduction of a new fiscal
rule using a difference-in-differences method. We contribute to the literature of
creative accounting by analyzing the interdependency of the new fiscal indexes,
which include three flow indexes and one stock index, and by identifying the
impacts of the new fiscal rule. In addition, we focus on both the “targeted
indexes” and the “untargeted indexes” of the new fiscal rule because some
of the municipalities might take advantage of loopholes in the new fiscal rule
to improve their “targeted indexes”. Our main contribution is the finding
that the municipalities increase their money transfers to the public enterprise
accounts, which is one of the “untargeted indexes”, after the introduction of
the new fiscal rule to avoid the applicable punishments. This phenomenon is
creative accounting because the municipalities postpone improving their true
fiscal deficits.
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1 Introduction
Alesina and Perotti (1996) show that fiscal policy encouraging the issuance of gov-
ernment bonds tends to expand fiscal deficits due to political influences. They argue
that the expansion of the fiscal deficit is caused by a lack of specific fiscal rules or
the low transparency of budget institutions. Previous studies on the positive effects
of fiscal rules are conducted using country- or state-level data from places such as
the US, the EU, or the OECD (e.g., Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1994), Poterba
(1994), von Hagen and Harden (1995), Kirchgässner (2002), Debrun et al. (2008)).
Similarly, some studies investigate the effects of the fiscal rules on local government
and support the effectiveness of fiscal rules (e.g., Luechinger and Schaltegger (2013),
Foremny(2014), Chatagny (2015), Grembi et al. (2016), Alpino et al. (2018), Bur-
ret and Feld (2018a), Burret and Feld (2018b)). Most previous studies show that
a relationship exists between fiscal rules and fiscal deficits, and reveal that fiscal
deficits are likely to be small when fiscal rules are strict.
To the best of our knowledge, however, some studies note that fiscal deficits
may increase when fiscal rules are suddenly changed or that the transparency of
the budget institution is decreased even when fiscal rules are strict. Milesi-Ferretti
(2003) conducts a theoretical analysis suggesting that fiscal adjustment or creative
accounting can easily result when introducing fiscal rules under fiscal institutions
with low transparency. Moreover, even if fiscal rules have a strong effect on im-
proving fiscal conditions, introducing overly strict fiscal rules may result in the use
of accounting gimmicks including creative accounting and fiscal gimmicks.
In addition to the theoretical analysis, although the definitions of creative ac-
counting differ depending on the country or studies, some studies empirically inves-
tigate creative accounting using country-level data (e.g., Koen and van den Noord
(2005), von Hagen and Wolff (2006), Beetsma et al. (2009), Maltriz and Wüste
(2015)). In particular, von Hagen and Wolff (2006) define creative accounting as
“stock-flow adjustments” including the issuance of zero-coupon bonds, transactions
in public assets, the privatization of public enterprises, the manipulation of record
timing, etc. As a result, the study reveals that there are large differences between
the accumulated fiscal deficits as flow variables and debt stocks as stock variables
on country-level data from 1980 to 2003.
Moreover, creative accounting in local governments has been empirically stud-
ied. Balduzzi and Grembi (2011) focus on changes in the fiscal rules of Italian
municipalities to investigate creative accounting but find that the municipalities
are not affected by changes in the fiscal rules. On the other hand, Clémenceau and
Soguel (2017) detect creative accounting in Swiss cantons. Furthermore, Burret and
Feld (2018a) reveal that Swiss cantonal debt brakes reduce fiscal deficits, but the
debt brakes cause some unintended effects including an evasion into unconstrained
accounts, emphasizing the importance of constraining all accounts1. Therefore, the
study of creative accounting in local governments remains controversial.
In this paper, we identify the fiscal effects of the new fiscal rule in Japan -
called “The Law Relating to the Financial Soundness of Local Governments” (Chi-
hou Koukyoudantai no Zaisei no Kenzenka ni Kansuru Houritsu in Japanese) -
which focuses on creative accounting including stock-flow adjustments by applying
a difference-in-differences (DID) method and using data from FY2007 to FY2010.
1Goto and Yamamoto (2019) investigate creative accounting on municipal mergers.
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The new fiscal rule introduces four fiscal indexes comprising three flow indexes and
one stock index. These new indexes target not only the general accounts of each
municipality but also those of extra-governmental organizations to reveal the true
fiscal conditions of all public sector entities. Before the introduction of the new fis-
cal rule, the fiscal management of all municipalities operated under the former fiscal
rule for approximately 60 years. However, because the former fiscal rule included
only two of the indexes relating to the fiscal balances and targeting the general
accounts, some of the municipalities were easily able to shift a portion of the fiscal
deficits in their general accounts to extra-governmental organizations to hide their
poor fiscal condition. The new fiscal rule was introduced in FY2008 to address this
problem.
Then, on April 1st, 2008, the central government enforced the new fiscal rule
and disclosed the formulas of the new fiscal indexes to the municipalities on April
28th, 2008. We use the time lag of institutional change because the municipalities
cannot calculate their new fiscal indexes by themselves before the enforcement of
the new fiscal rule. In particular, some of the municipalities that suffer from a large
former redemption index might engage in creative accounting under the new fiscal
rule.
We contribute to the literature of creative accounting in the following two ways.
First, we focus on the effects of the four new fiscal indexes that are employed due to
the introduction of the new fiscal rule in terms of creative accounting by stock-flow
adjustments. From a global perspective, this new fiscal rule in Japan is atypical
because, in many countries, local governments introduce either balanced-budget
or debt-limit rules. Previous studies investigate the effects of only one type of
fiscal rule. However, the new fiscal rule in Japan simultaneously adopts three flow
indexes and one stock index for the municipalities. These three flow indexes have
both “yellow cards”, which require the municipalities to plan for early financial
soundness, and “red cards”, which require the municipalities to be under the control
of the central government to rebuild stable financial conditions. The stock index
does not include a red card. Thus, some of the municipalities that suffer from
large fiscal deficits may have an incentive to engage in creative accounting to avoid
fiscal management under the supervision of the central government. Thus, these
municipalities may decrease their flow indexes by increasing their stock indexes,
which does not include a red card. Moreover, the Japanese new fiscal rule is clearly
different than that of other countries. The new fiscal indexes target not only the
general accounts but also extra-governmental organizations. Another contribution
of this study is its focus on extra-governmental organizations after the introduction
of the new fiscal rule. Thus, we consider creative accounting including stock-flow
adjustments that may occur among all of the public sector accounts.
Second, to investigate the creative accounting within legal limitations, we also
focus on the differences in the “targeted indexes” and “untargeted indexes” of
the new fiscal rule. In this paper, “targeted indexes” refer to the four new fiscal
indexes, and “untargeted indexes” refer to the indexes of reserved funds and to
money transfers from the general accounts to the public enterprise accounts. Even
if the municipalities appear to improve their new fiscal indexes, we must investigate
whether they engage in creative accounting without breaking the new fiscal rule by
decreasing the reserved funds or increasing money transfers. For example, under
the former fiscal rule, some of the municipalities hid the fiscal deficits of extra-
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governmental organizations by decreasing their funds or by increasing the money
transfers from the general accounts to the other accounts. Through this behavior,
the municipalities can postpone improving their fiscal conditions. We consider that
the behavior is one of the stock-flow adjustments of creative accounting according to
von Hagen and Wolff (2006). Therefore, we focus not only on the “targeted indexes”
of the new fiscal rule but also on the “untargeted indexes”, such as reserved funds
and money transfers.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the institutional back-
ground and former fiscal rule. Section 3 presents Japan’s new fiscal rule enacted
in 2008. Section 4 explains the empirical method used. Section 5 presents the es-
timation results and robustness checks, Section 6 discusses our results and Section
7 concludes the paper.
2 Institutional background
2.1 Local public finance in Japan
In this section, we briefly describe the institutional background of Japan’s local
public finance and the fiscal rules. The public sector, based on the System of Na-
tional Accounts, comprises the central government, local government, and social
security fund. In FY2007, the gross domestic expenditures of Japan were 515 tril-
lion Japanese yen (JPY), which was approximately 5 trillion United States dollars
(USD) at an exchange rate of 100 JPY to one USD. Local government’s expenditure
includes 57 trillion JPY (0.57 trillion USD), while the central government’s expen-
diture is 20 trillion JPY (0.2 trillion USD). The proportion of the local government’s
expenditure relative to the gross domestic expenditures is approximately 11.2 % in
FY2007, which is approximately three times higher than that of the central gov-
ernment. This finding indicates that the local government is highly dependent on
intergovernmental transfers from the central government.
In terms of the scale of the settled accounts, the ratio of the central to the
local government’s tax revenue was six to four in FY2007. On the other hand,
the ratio of the central to local government’s expenditure was four to six. Thus,
the central government’s revenues are larger than those of the local government,
but the former’s expenditures are smaller. This gap is filled by intergovernmental
transfers from the central to local government. On average, the intergovernmental
transfers account for 30 % of local government’s total revenue.
Japan’s government exists in a three-layer system: the central, prefectural, and
municipal governments (cities, towns, and villages). Local governments play an im-
portant role in providing many public services, including public education, public
welfare, public health, fire services, construction work, and waste disposal. In the
municipalities, the expenditure size comprises public welfare, construction work,
and debt servicing expenses. In addition, classified by expenditure categories, mu-
nicipal expenditures can be divided into obligatory expenses (personnel expenses,
social assistance expenses, and public debt payments); investment expenses, includ-
ing ordinary construction expenses; and other expenses, including reserve funds. In
the 2000s, social assistance expenses and public debt payments gradually increased,
while ordinary construction expenses decreased.
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2.2 Classification of the municipalities
The number of the municipalities was 1,799 at the end of FY2007, which was divided
into 783 cities (shi), 815 towns (machi), and 201 villages (mura). The cities are
also divided into four categories: ordinance-designated cities (Seirei Shitei toshi),
core cities (Chukaku shi), special-case cities (Tokurei shi), and standard cities. The
cities comprise 17 ordinance-designated cities, 35 core cities, 44 special-case cities,
and others.
The cities have different types of authorities and fiscal resources on the adminis-
tration. Ordinance-designated cities are those with a population of 500,000 or more
and are designated by a cabinet order under a special provision. Such cities have
nearly the same level of authority and fiscal resources as prefectures. Core cities
are those with a population size of at least 300,000, and part of their authority is
delegated by prefectures, although the scope of their authority is smaller than that
of ordinance-designated cities. Similarly, special-case cities are those with a popula-
tion size of at least 200,000, and part of their authority is delegated by prefectures,
although the scope of their authority is smaller than that of core cities. Cities are
defined as having a population size of at least 50,000; however, the authority differs
little among cities, towns, and villages.
2.3 Public accounts for the municipal government
Normally, in public finance, the accounts of the municipal government are divided
into general and special accounts. Special accounts consist of public enterprise ac-
counts, such as those for transport businesses, electricity businesses, gas businesses,
and residential land development projects. However, because each municipality
provides different services depending on the local conditions, the types of special
accounts differ.
To compare the accounts of all municipalities uniformly, Japan’s central govern-
ment establishes “ordinary accounts” that cover the general accounts and a common
component of the special accounts. Thus, we can elucidate the fiscal conditions of
the municipalities and conduct a statistical comparison among them using ordinary
and other public enterprise accounts.
The municipal governments include some extra-governmental organizations, in-
cluding partial administrative associations (Ichibu Jimu Kumiai), wide-area local
public bodies (Kouiki Rengou), local public corporations (Chihou Kousha), and
third-sector enterprises. These organizations have accounts independent from the
ordinary accounts. Partial administrative associations and wide-area local public
bodies are extra-governmental organizations that cooperate with neighboring mu-
nicipalities to provide public services, including fire rescue, waste-removal services,
and public long-term care insurance. Partial administrative associations provide
a single service in cooperation with neighboring municipalities. Wide-area local
public bodies provide multiple services in cooperation with neighboring municipal-
ities. Third-sector enterprises are joint enterprises between the public and private
sectors.
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2.4 Former fiscal rule
2.4.1 Former balance index
Before the new fiscal rule was enacted in FY2008, the fiscal management of all of the
municipalities was conducted under “The Law on Special Measures for the Promo-
tion of Local Financial Reconstruction” (Chihou Zaisei Saiken Sokushin Tokubetsu
Sochi Hou), which is referred to as the former fiscal rule. The former fiscal rule was
enforced from FY1955 to FY2009 and targeted only the ordinary accounts for the
municipalities.
The central government established a “former balance index” (Jisshitsu Shuushi
Hiritsu) for local government and define the financial reconstruction stage (red
card) in the former fiscal rule. If the former balance index was lower than -20%,
the municipalities had to undertake fiscal reconstruction under the control of the
central government and were not allowed to issue local bonds. The municipalities
under the control of the central government had to formulate a fiscal reconstruction
plan with the agreement of the minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications (MIC). Thus, since the former fiscal rule had only the red card
criterion, not the yellow card, the municipalities suddenly face the problem of fiscal
reconstruction when the former balance index exceeds -20%.
Additionally, “The Local Public Enterprise Law” (Chihou Koei Kigyo Hou),
which corresponds to the former fiscal rule for the municipalities, was applied to the
public enterprise accounts. Although public enterprises had adopted a financially
independent accounting system approximately 60 years previously, the system in
Japan is quite far removed from international accounting standards or those used
in private companies.
For example, the notice of the MIC relating to public enterprises approved the
municipalities’ implementation of an expense of “money transfers” (Kuridashikin)
to such an extent as they consider necessary from the ordinary accounts to the
public enterprise accounts or other accounts for management.
2.4.2 Former redemption index
In addition to the former fiscal rule, the central government practically managed
the permission system of the bond issuance for local governments from FY1947
to FY2006 based on “The Local Autonomy Law” (Chihou Jichi Hou), which is a
different legal basis from the former fiscal rule. The aim of the permission system of
the bond issuance was for the central government to impose a temporary limitation
of the bond issuance to control local public finance for restoration in the post-WWII
period. The law required temporal permission for bond issuance by the minister or
prefectural governor.
However, the permission system for bond issuance had been managed previ-
ously by the central government as a customary practice of the local public finance
system without a clear legal basis. The official notices for bond issuance permis-
sion from the administrative vice-minister (Chihousai Hakkou Kyoka Houshin) were
frequently announced to reduce bond issuance and were sufficient for local govern-
ments over the past 60 years. Although the notice had no legal basis, it strongly
affected fiscal management, especially the ordinary accounts of the municipalities
(See, for example, Doi (2007), Mochida and Hayashi (2018) for detail.).
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To manage the permission system of bond issuance, the central government es-
tablished a “former redemption index” (Kisai Seigen Hiritsu) and set some criteria
for the ordinary accounts. If the former redemption index ranged from 15% to 20%,
the municipalities were called a caution group, and they then had to formulate a
bond management plan, on which no penalties were imposed. On the other hand,
the municipalities whose indexes ranged from 20% to 30% were called a partial
limitation group, and those whose indexes were more than 30% were called a strict
limitation group. These two limitation groups had to obtain permission from the
central or prefectural government to issue new bonds. Thus, these criteria were
exogenously determined by the upper government under the former fiscal rule.
2.4.3 Problems with the former fiscal rule
The former fiscal rule had many problems, making the high transparency and ac-
countability of fiscal management difficult because those indexes were based on
different laws. Considering these points, the MIC summarized the problems of the
former fiscal rules as follows: (1) The disclosure of fiscal information is inadequate,
(2) the red card criterion exists only for the balance index and no yellow card cri-
terion exists, (3) the balance index is a flow index and targets only the ordinary
accounts, and (4) public enterprises have the same problems.
Even if some municipalities seemed to have better fiscal conditions, they made
it seem so by drawing on “reserve funds” (Tsumitatekin) that were kept for the
repayment of debts in the future. Some municipalities were easily able to shift a
part of the fiscal deficits of their ordinary accounts to extra-governmental organi-
zations to hide poor fiscal conditions since the former fiscal rule included only two
of the indexes relating to fiscal balance and the redemption indexes of the ordinary
accounts as a target.
Other municipalities sometimes manipulated the fiscal conditions of the pub-
lic enterprise accounts by increasing the amounts of the money transfers from the
ordinary accounts to the public enterprise accounts beyond the expected level of
the central government (Kuridashi Kijyun) to compensate for the public enter-
prises’ fiscal deficits (For example, Konishi (2014)). This phenomenon occurred
because the public enterprises are divided in the law into two groups between reg-
ulated (Hou Tekiyou) and non-regulated enterprises (Hou Hi Tekiyou), making the
money transfers difficult to monitor. The amounts of the money transfers for regu-
lated enterprises including water, transportation, electricity, gas, hospital services,
etc., were monitored by the central government, but those for non-regulated en-
terprises including small-scale water service, the management of sewerage service,
etc., were weakly monitored. Thus, the criterion of the money transfers for the pub-
lic enterprises was proposed by the central government each year as a preferable
transfer level, but the money transfers for the sewerage services of non-regulated
enterprises quite often exceeded the criterion. Thus, the fiscal conditions of the
extra-governmental organizations were difficult to observe under the former fiscal
rule because these organizations did not have a certain index and no penalties were
in place for the money transfers.
As an unusual case apart from creative accounting, Yubari city in Hokkaido pre-
fecture went practically fiscal bankrupt in March 2007, in which its former balance
index achieved -791%. This event was due to illegal creative accounting between
the ordinary accounts and extra-governmental organizations, such as third-sector
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enterprises. Because Yubari city transferred large debts, which they had to repay,
to the other accounts, it accumulated debts approximately 65 times as large as its
tax revenue before bankruptcy. Thus, Yubari city has reconstructed its fiscal con-
ditions with a severe restriction under the control of the central government from
2007 to 2027.
3 New fiscal rule in 2008
3.1 Introduction of the new fiscal rule
To improve fiscal conditions and work towards a high level of transparency in fiscal
management, the central government enacted “The Law Relating to the Financial
Soundness of Local Governments” (Chihou Koukyoudantai no Zaisei no Kenzenka
ni Kansuru Houritsu) for local governments, which is referred to as the “new fiscal
rule”. The new fiscal rule was enforced in FY2008 and included four new fiscal
indexes.
Fig. 1 shows the timeline for the introduction of the new fiscal rule. Japan’s
fiscal year begins in April. The new fiscal rule was promulgated on June 22, 2007
and announced the setting of the new fiscal indexes on December 7, 2007, but the
detailed formulas of the new fiscal indexes were not decided at that time. The
central government ordered local governments to disclose the new fiscal indexes
from the settled account of FY2007. Thus, we can obtain the confirmed data of
the new fiscal indexes in each municipality from FY2007.
The enforcement of the new fiscal rule means that, except for the fiscal indexes in
FY2007, the municipalities are penalized if they do not meet the criteria and could
come under the control of the central government. While the confirmed indexes
of FY2007 carry no penalties, penalties are imposed after FY2008 if at least one
index exceeds a criterion.
An important point of this enforcement of the fiscal rule is that the formulas
of the new fiscal indexes were not disclosed to the municipalities in FY2007. The
central government enforced the new fiscal rule on April 1, 2008. The formulas of
the new fiscal indexes were disclosed on April 28, 2008, and then an explanatory
meeting was held by the MIC to present detailed formulas for the municipalities on
May 9, 2008. Based on the result of the meeting, the municipalities disclosed their
confirmed indexes of FY2007 on November 28, 2008. Since the fiscal year in 2007
had already ended at the time of the formula’s disclosure, municipalities found it
practically difficult to manipulate their indexes of FY2007 by using the methods
described in the previous section, such as decreasing reserve funds, increasing money
transfers, or hiding deficits.
This paper assumes that the new fiscal rule affects the municipal settled ac-
counts after FY2008. Thus, we focus on both the timing of the announcement of
the new fiscal rule in FY2007 and on the fiscal indexes after FY2008 to identify the
fiscal effects of the introduction of the new fiscal rule.
3.2 New fiscal indexes
Fig. 2 presents the target accounts of the new fiscal indexes that measure the
degree of municipal fiscal soundness. The new fiscal indexes comprise four fiscal
indexes including both the revised balance and the revised redemption indexes:
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three flow indexes and one stock index. These new indexes cover not only the
ordinary accounts in each municipality but also extra-governmental organizations
to reveal the true fiscal condition of the public sector.
The “balance index” is the ratio of the fiscal surplus of the ordinary accounts




The standard financial scale includes the general revenues of the municipalities for
each fiscal year, which consist of standard local tax revenues and local allocation tax
grants (LAT grants) from the central government. An LAT grant is an unspecific
grant for local governments. The number of LAT grants provided to each munici-
pality is determined by the central government based on municipal fiscal shortages
for each fiscal year3. The balance index covers only the ordinary accounts with
nearly the same scope as the former fiscal rule.
The “consolidated balance index” is the ratio of the consolidated fiscal surplus of
the ordinary accounts and the public enterprise accounts to the standard financial




The consolidated balance index covers the ordinary accounts and the public enter-
prise accounts. Under the former rule, we were able to check for the bad debt only
of each public enterprise. Although the municipalities generally manage public en-
terprises, the relationship between the ordinary accounts and the public enterprise
accounts was difficult to confirm.
The “redemption index” is the ratio of the number of the redeemed bonds of
the ordinary accounts, the public enterprise accounts, the partial administrative
associations, and the wide-area local public bodies to the standard financial scale




The redemption index covers the ordinary accounts and the wide-area local public
bodies and shows how much debt the municipalities must repay each year. However,
the redemption index is calculated by excluding specific grants from the numerator
of the index. Therefore, if the municipalities increase the number of specific grants
they are awarded, they can reduce their redemption indexes.
2The balance and the consolidated balance indexes are the real deficit index (Jishitsu Akaji
Hiritsu) and the consolidated real deficit index (Renketsu Jishitsu Akaji Hiritsu), respectively. We
multiplied both indexes by -1 so we could compare them with the former balance index. In this
section, we follow the “White Paper on Local Public Finance, 2007” that was published by the
MIC. For details, see MIC (2007), and Appendix. A
3For further information on the LAT grant system, see Ihori (2009), Saito and Yunoue (2009),
and Hirota and Yunoue (2017).
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The “future burden index” is the ratio of the current outstanding balance of
the future burden, including that of the debts of the local general account as well
as other likely future payments. It represents the extent to which finances may be





The numerator of the future burden index consists of the accumulated debts in
the ordinary accounts and the debt burdens of extra-governmental organizations
and includes the consolidated fiscal surplus as a stock variable. Thus, if the mu-
nicipalities have a large debt burden in their third-sector enterprise accounts, their
future burden indexes increase. However, the future burden index is calculated by
excluding the estimated amount of specific grants and appropriable funds, includ-
ing reserved funds and others, from the numerator of the index. Therefore, if the
municipalities increase the amount of their specific grants or decrease their reserved
funds, then they can reduce their future burden indexes.
The numerators of both the consolidated balance and the future burden in-
dexes include, to some extent, estimated amounts of the money transfers from the
ordinary to the other accounts, but the money transfers to both regulated and non-
regulated enterprises remain important problems. Thus, we should investigate the
money transfers in addition to the targeted indexes.
3.3 Criteria of the new fiscal indexes
Fig. 3 presents a diagram of the financial status of the local governments. The new
fiscal rule establishes four new indexes and requires local governments to disclose
them thoroughly with the aim of quickly achieving financial soundness or rebuilding.
The four new indexes include a number of financial criteria: For example, if
the municipalities exceed the balance index by between -11.25 and -15%, depend-
ing on their fiscal size, they are within the early financial soundness restoration
stage (yellow card) and must improve their fiscal conditions by themselves. In this
case, the municipalities must formulate a financial soundness plan to be approved
by local councils and conduct a mandatory external audit. Additionally, the mu-
nicipalities must report on their implementation progress to local councils and via
public announcements every fiscal year. If the early achievement of financial sound-
ness is deemed very difficult, the MIC or the prefectural governor makes necessary
recommendations. All four indexes include a yellow card.
Moreover, if the municipalities exceed the balance index of -20 %, they are
within the financial rebuilding stage (red card) and must be fiscally managed un-
der the control of the central government. These municipalities must perform a
thorough financial rebuilding with the involvement of the central government. In
this case, the municipalities must formulate a financial rebuilding plan to be ap-
proved by local councils and conduct a mandatory external audit. Additionally,
they must obtain agreement on the financial rebuilding plan in consultation with
the MIC.
Similarly, the criteria for the consolidated balance, redemption, and future bur-
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den indexes are determined in the new fiscal rule. Although the future burden
index includes a yellow card, for which the criteria is 350 %, it does not include a
red card.
Fig. 4 presents the comparison of the criteria between the former and new
redemption indexes. The formulas for both the former and new redemption indexes
are similar, but those for the coverage among accounts are quite different. Because,
after the introduction of the new fiscal rule, the coverage of the new redemption
index is expanded to include not only the ordinary accounts but also the public
enterprise accounts and other associations, each municipality must improve the
fiscal conditions of the public enterprise and other accounts.
If the new redemption index is higher than 18 %, the municipalities must obtain
permission from the central government to issue a new bond under the new fiscal
rule. A different point is that the caution group of the former index, which ranged
from 15 % to 20%, did not impose any penalties, but, in the new fiscal rule, the
caution group requires agreement from the MIC for issuing new bonds.
We expect that the municipalities could not precisely calculate the new index
in FY2007, because those formulas were disclosed on April 28, 2008. Therefore,
the municipalities found it difficult to implement the creative accounting between
the ordinary accounts and the other accounts in FY2007, and they must accept
that situation. On the other hand, some municipalities that ranged in the caution
group under the former rule might fiscally adjust their fiscal conditions among their
related accounts after FY2008 to avoiding the deterioration of their new indexes
because they are concerned with the new penalties associated with the yellow card.
4 Empirical framework
4.1 Identification strategy
In this section, we explain our identification strategy by applying the DID approach
to identify the fiscal effects of the introduction of the new fiscal rule. We focus on
the institutional change between the announcement of the new fiscal rule in FY2007
and its enforcement in FY2008.
Let Yit denote an outcome variable, such as some fiscal indexes of interest. The
subscript i represents the municipality, and t represents the fiscal year. Equation
(1) presents the DID estimation model.
Yi,t = β1Ti ∗ 2008t + β2Ti ∗ 2009t + β3Ti ∗ 2010t
+δXi,t + γXi,T0τt + µi + τt + ϵi,t
(1)
where Xi,t is the covariates of the municipality, µi is the fixed effects of municipality
i, τt is the year fixed effects for year t, and ϵi,t is an error term. β is a parameter
of interest, and δ is a parameter to be estimated.
The treatment group in this setup is the interaction terms between Ti where T
is a treatment indicator for municipality i and year variables are from FY2008 to
FY2010. To identify the fiscal effects of the new fiscal rule, we define a certain treat-
ment group of the municipalities by applying the criterion of the former redemption
index that was determined exogenously by the central government under the former
rule. We did so because Japan, a country with centralized policy-making, rarely ex-
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ploits sub-national policy changes for the DID estimation (See, for example, Meyer
et al. (1995).)4. The new fiscal rule applies to the whole of each municipality, al-
though it might largely affect the municipalities with worse fiscal conditions. Thus,
the municipalities with relatively better fiscal conditions are used as a control group
in the DID. The detailed assignment for the treatment group is described below in
subsection 4.2.
Considering this situation, however, we should carefully set the assignment be-
tween the treatment and control groups. Therefore, we should consider interaction
terms XiT0τt between the predetermined covariates and the year fixed effects. T0
shows a pretreatment period. In our estimation, we apply the first year of the pre-
treatment period to T0. To control the correlation between the covariates and the
year fixed effects with the treatment groups, we add the interaction terms that are
the predetermined covariates multiplied by the year fixed effects with the treatment
groups, following de Janvry et al. (2015) and Christfzik (2019). γ is a parameter
to be estimated.
For example, after the introduction of the new fiscal rule, the municipalities
with better fiscal conditions have conditions that are easier to improve than those
with worse fiscal conditions. If such characteristics were completely time invariant,
the fixed effect model would obtain consistent estimates. If not, the model would
be not consistent due to selection bias as to whether the treatment group equals
1 or not. To address the problem of the assignment between the treatment and
control groups being affected by the time-invariant predetermined covariates, we
consider the interaction terms.
4.2 Data
In the DID model, we use the Japanese municipal data from FY2007 to FY2010
because the new fiscal rule has been in force since FY2008. The data on the mu-
nicipal governments are derived primarily from the Statistics of the Final Accounts
of Municipal Governments (Shi Chou Son Kessan Jyokyo Shirabe), Municipal Fi-
nancial Situation list (Zaisei Jyokyo tou Ichiran Hyou) and the Digital Archive of
Municipal Mergers (Gappei Digital Archive).
4.2.1 Sample
We use data from 1,776 municipalities from FY2007 to FY2010 in our estimation.
Note that, however, we cannot obtain the new fiscal indexes before the introduc-
tion of the new fiscal rule even if the outline of the new indexes is disclosed (See,
appendix A.). To calculate the new fiscal indexes, we definitely need to obtain the
basic figures, such as the estimated amount of the burden, etc., for each munic-
ipality and extra-governmental organization. Although we obtain the data from
FY2007 to the latest year on the website5, we are not allowed to obtain the basic
figures before FY2006.
4Meyer et al. (1995) assigns high-earning workers to a treatment group and the low-earning
workers to a control group for a DID estimation to examine the impact of increases in benefits for
work-related injuries in the United States states of Kentucky and Michigan.
5See, the MIC website in Japanese (https://www.soumu.go.jp/iken/zaisei/kenzenka/
youshiki/index.html). We tried to request for the disclosure of the official information to the
MIC, but, unfortunately, we did not obtain the basic figures for the new fiscal indexes before
FY2006.
11
Additionally, to evaluate the fiscal effects of the new fiscal rule properly, we did
not use data from FY2011 because a number of the municipalities were severely
damaged by the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011. In the subse-
quent years, these municipalities received many kinds of support, including a large
number of special grants issued by the central government and others. We dropped
the data from FY2011 in this paper to avoid the effects of the earthquake.
Moreover, many municipalities chose to merge, especially between FY2004 and
FY2005. The number of municipalities rapidly decreased from 3,232 in FY1998 to
1,821 in FY2005. This result is because the central government enforced the special
municipal mergers law and induced municipalities to choose to merge by using
special treatments such as special grants and bonds. Hirota and Yunoue (2017)
reveal that the merged municipalities increased the public investment expenses and
the local bonds for becoming free-riders on their partners. Therefore, we use the
data from FY2007 to FY2010 that excludes the merged municipalities after FY2007.
However, the data includes the merged municipalities that chose to merge up to
FY2005, which are controlled in our estimation.
In addition, since Yubari city is under the control of the central government in
the new fiscal rule, we exclude Yubari city in our estimation. The future burden
index of Yubari city was more than 1,000 % for a few years.
4.2.2 Treatment group
On December 7, 2007 the central government set the new fiscal indexes for the
municipalities. The central government began enforcing the new fiscal rule on April
1, 2008 and disclosed the formulas of the new fiscal indexes to the municipalities
on April 28, 2008. Accordingly, we employ the former redemption index under the
former fiscal rule as the treatment group. Some of the municipalities that suffered
from a previously high redemption index before the introduction might manipulate
their accounts within the allowable range of the new fiscal rule.
Therefore, we define as the treatment group any municipality whose former re-
demption indexes in “FY2006”, which is just before the announcement of the new
fiscal rule in FY2007, were higher than 15 %. As mentioned above, the municipali-
ties whose indexes ranged from 15 % to 20 % were called the caution group but were
not punished in any way. However, the municipalities whose indexes were higher
than 20 % were the limitation group, which included the strict limitation group.
These limitation groups had to obtain permission from the central government to
issue bonds. Thus, we consider that these criteria were exogenously decided by the
central government under the former fiscal rule. For these reasons, we apply the
former redemption index as the determiner of the treatment group.
4.2.3 Outcome variables
In this paper, we focus on two categories of outcome variables: the “targeted in-
dexes” and the “untargeted indexes” of the new fiscal rule. The targeted indexes
comprise the balance, consolidated balance, redemption, and future burden indexes.
The untargeted indexes comprise a fund index and a money transfer index in this
paper. In particular, we mainly investigate the following two points.
First, to investigate the stock-flow adjustments within the new fiscal rule, which
is one of the methods of creative accounting, we apply the new four fiscal indexes as
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the targeted indexes. The new fiscal rule aims to revise the former rule, including
improving the fiscal indexes’ formulas and the expansion of the coverage of public
accounts. Thus, we investigate the fiscal effects not only on whether the new fiscal
rule overcomes the problems of the former rules described above but also on whether
the municipalities implement the stock-flow adjustments. We consider the following
situation in which, for example, even if the municipalities improve the flow indexes,
they might worsen the stock index since the future burden index does not entail a
red card penalty. Thus, we investigate whether the municipalities implement the
stock-flow adjustments under the new fiscal rule.
Second, to investigate the use of creative accounting within legal limitations,
which are also so-called legal gray areas, we apply both the fund index and the
money transfer index as the untargeted indexes. The fund index is intended for
the repayment of bonds for each municipality and is obtained by dividing the total
amount of the reserve funds (thousand JPY) by the population size. Although
the future burden index includes some amount of the reserve funds, the amount
may be insufficient. This situation is because the municipalities can decrease their
balance and consolidated their balance indexes by reducing the funds reserved for
the repayment of bonds while allowing for an increase in their future burden indexes,
which does not entail a red card.
Additionally, we define the money transfer index that represents the money
transfers from the ordinary accounts to the public enterprise accounts or others.
The money transfer index is obtained by dividing the total amount of the money
transfers (thousand JPY) by the population size. This result occurs because some
municipalities shifted their fiscal deficits to their own extra-governmental organi-
zations to hide their fiscal deficits under the former fiscal rule. In addition, the
money transfers affect the consolidated balance and future burden indexes because
if the municipalities increase their money transfers, they can pretend to improve
both of those indexes through a consolidated fiscal surplus. Although the numera-
tors of both the redemption and future burden indexes include, to some extent, the
estimated amounts of the money transfers from the ordinary accounts to the other
accounts, the problems of both regulated and non-regulated enterprises remain im-
portant. In particular, non-regulated enterprises are allowed to increase money
transfers easily because they are weakly monitored by the central government.
4.2.4 Control variables
The covariates consist of the quadratic function of the population size, the share of
the population size under the age of 15; the share of the population size over the
age of 65; the merged trends; the dummies of the ordinance-designated cities, core
cities, and special-case cities; and the share of the primary and secondary industrial
workers among total workers.
The merged trends indicate the passed year after the municipal mergers through
the special municipal mergers law in place between FY1999 and FY2005. This result
is because the merged municipalities received special treatment including special
grants and special bonds after the mergers of 15 years. We, however, exclude the
municipalities that chose to merge after FY2007, as mentioned above.
The city size dummy variables consist of an ordinance-designated cities dummy,
a core cities dummy, and a special-case cities dummy. Because these cities provide
different types of public services depending on their size, we must consider city size
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in our estimation. Specifically, the yellow card of the future burden index criterion
for ordinance-designated cities is 400 %, while that of other cities is 350 %.
Japan’s municipalities have little right to impose their own local taxes as the sys-
tem is centralized. Most local tax rates are determined by central government law
for obtaining horizontal fiscal equity among the municipalities. The tax capacity of
the municipalities depends on their population size or area. Additionally, almost all
municipalities depend on a large amount of transfers from the central government.
The revenue side of Japan’s municipalities is inflexible and determined. Therefore,
we exclude the fiscal covariates.
The interaction terms XiT0τt are between the year variables and the predeter-
mined covariates of FY2007. The year is the first period in our data. In addition
to our covariates, we include the interaction terms between the predetermined area
of FY2007 and the year variables, but we exclude the area of the municipalities in
our covariates.
4.3 Summary statistics
The summary statistics of FY2007 are reported in Table 1. The numbers of the
treatment and control groups are 195 and 1951, respectively. Since we adopt the
municipalities whose former redemption index just before the introduction of the
new fiscal rule was higher than 15 %, the new fiscal indexes of the treatment group
are comparatively worse than those of the control group.
The means of the treatment group between the balance, consolidated balance,
redemption, and future burden indexes are 3.155, 9.579, 20.408, and 153.663, re-
spectively. The fund index of the treatment group is approximately 237.936 and
higher than that of the control group. This result indicates that the municipalities
with high former redemption indexes prepare funds for the repayment of debts in
the future. On the other hand, the money transfer index of the treatment group
is approximately 76.618 and is higher than that of the control groups. The munic-
ipalities with worse fiscal conditions tend to increase their money transfers to the
other accounts.
The covariates differ between the treatment and control groups in the pretreat-
ment period. The shares of the population size under the age of 15 and over the
age of 65 are statistically significant on simple t-tests. The dummy variables for
the designated and special-case cities are statistically significant. The shares of the
primary and secondary industrial workers also are different. Additionally, the area
between the treatment and control groups is statistically significant. Thus, we sus-
pect that the assignment between the treatment and control groups is non-random
and that selection bias affects each group. Thus, we consider not only the covariates
but also the interaction terms between the predetermined covariates and the year
variables.
Fig. 5 shows the trends in the targeted indexes. We reveal that the trends
for all of the four indexes improve after the enforcement of the new fiscal rule.
In particular, the balance index of the treatment group clearly increases. The
consolidated balance index exhibits a similar tendency. The redemption and future
burden indexes improve. In addition, Fig. 6 shows the trends in the untargeted
indexes. For the fund indexes, both the treatment and control groups increase. The
money transfer indexes of the treatment group rapidly increases, while those of the
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control group slightly increases.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Effects on targeted indexes
Table 2 shows the estimation results for the targeted indexes by using the DID
method for the period from FY2007 to FY2010. We use some control variables to
estimate each index described as the following three patterns: (1) the year fixed
effects, (2) the covariates and the year fixed effects and (3) all controls including
the interaction terms between the predetermined covariates and the year variables.
As a benchmark, column (1) of the estimation model of each index in Table 2
reports the DID model without any of the covariates. Almost all of the treatment
groups are statistically significant in each index except for the redemption index of
FY2008. For both the balance and the consolidated balance indexes, the treatment
groups each year are significantly positive. The treatment groups of the redemp-
tion and the future burden indexes are significantly negative. Column (2) of the
estimation model in Table 2 reports the DID model with the year fixed effects and
the covariates. These results exhibit a similar tendency as the results of column (1)
except for the redemption index of FY2008.
Our main results for the targeted indexes are shown in column (3) for each index
in Table 2. For the balance index, the treatment groups each year are statistically
significantly positive. The Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATTs) of the
balance index are 0.63, 0.89, and 1.54 from FY2008 to FY2010. These ATTs are
slightly smaller than both columns (1) and (2) because we consider the interaction
terms between the predetermined covariates and the year variables. The ordinary
accounts of the municipalities improved after the introduction of the new fiscal rule.
For the consolidated index, this result exhibits a similar tendency as the balance
index results. The treatment groups each year are also statistically significantly
positive. The ATTs of the consolidated balance indexes are 1.11, 2.04, and 2.75 from
FY2008 to FY2010. These figures are larger than those of the balance indexes each
year. The results indicate that the municipalities improve the fiscal conditions of the
public enterprises more than they do their ordinary accounts. For the redemption
index, the treatment groups of FY2009 and FY2010 are statistically significantly
negative. The ATTs of the redemption index are -0.87 and -1.64 in FY2009 and
FY2010, respectively. The municipalities with high former redemption indexes
improve their redemption indexes, except for the settlement of FY2008, which is
just after the introduction of the new fiscal rule. For the future burden index, the
treatment variables each year are statistically significantly negative. The ATTs of
the future burden index are -6.08, -12.92, and -18.36 from FY2008 to FY2010. The
municipalities with high former redemption indexes improve their future burden
and the other new fiscal indexes.
As a result, we reveal that the municipalities improve their new fiscal indexes
without stock-flow-adjustments after the introduction of the new fiscal rule, and
the new fiscal rule is effective for the municipalities. Because the municipalities
fully understand that the new fiscal indexes are stricter than the former indexes,
they positively implement the improvement of the new fiscal indexes. However, as
mentioned above, to investigate the fiscal effects of the new fiscal rule, we should
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investigate not only the targeted indexes but also the untargeted indexes including
the fund and money transfer indexes.
5.2 Effects on the untargeted indexes
Given these results for the new fiscal indexes, we consider the estimation result of
the fund and the money transfer indexes. We show the results of the untargeted
indexes in Table 3. Similarly, we show the estimation results for each index from the
three patterns: (1) the year fixed effects, (2) the covariates and the year fixed effects,
and (3) all controls including the interaction terms between the predetermined
covariates and the year variables.
In the column (1) and (2) of Table 3, the treatment groups both the fund and
money transfer indexes are positive significant. Additionally, our main results for
the untargeted indexes show in column (3). The treatment groups of the fund index
are not statistically significant, which are different from the column (1) and (2).
Considering the interaction terms between the predetermined covariates and the
year variables, the fund index exhibits no differences between the treatment and
control groups.
However, the treatment groups of the money transfer index from the ordinary
accounts to the public enterprise accounts are statistically significantly positive at
standard levels each year. These results should be interpreted with caution because
of the creative accounting used between accounts to avoid exceeding the criterion
of the new fiscal index relating to the public enterprise accounts. The ATTs of the
money transfer index are 3.95, 6.32, and 7.24 from FY2008 to FY2010. Thus, these
ATTs are 39, 63 and 72 dollars per capita at the exchange rate of 100 Japanese yen
to the United States dollar.
Interestingly, we clearly reveal that the municipalities that suffer from the for-
mer redemption index engage in creative accounting to deal with the criterion of
the new fiscal index within the new fiscal rule, especially with regard to the public
enterprise accounts.
5.3 Robustness checks
In this subsection, we start the robustness and validity checks by using the following
three patterns.
5.3.1 Sample of Yubari city
First, we estimate the same model for each index in the sample with Yubari city
added. Because Yubari city went fiscally bankrupt in FY2006 under the former
fiscal rule and has been under the control of the central government from FY2006
to FY2027, we investigate the fiscal effects of the new fiscal rule for the city with
the additional sample. Although the reconstruction plan of Yubari city spreads
across two fiscal rules, the most recent period for the reconstruction is under the
new fiscal rule.
Table 4 shows the estimation results adding Yubari city. Unlike our main results
for the targeted indexes excluding Yubari city, the treatment variable of the balance
indexes only in FY2008 is statistically significantly positive. The treatment groups
of the consolidated balance indexes in both FY2008 and FY2010 are statistically
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significantly positive. For the treatment groups, both the balance and the consoli-
dated balance indexes each year of column (3) in Table 2 are positively estimated
with the sample excluding Yubari city, but the results in Table 4 indicate that the
new fiscal rule has weak effects on the fiscal surplus. Moreover, for the treatment
groups, both the redemption and the future burden indexes exhibit similar results
as those in Table 2, and their coefficients are negatively estimated except for the
result of the redemption indexes in FY2008.
For the untargeted indexes, the results are quite similar to those shown in Table
2. The treatment groups of the fund indexes each year are statistically insignifi-
cant. On the other hand, those of the money transfer indexes are statistically
significantly positive. The treatment group clearly increases their money transfers
for the public enterprise accounts after the introduction of the new fiscal rule, and
those coefficients are nearly the same as the results, excluding Yubari city.
5.3.2 Different thresholds
Second, to check the robustness of the treatment group, we consider other treat-
ment variables by using the different thresholds of the former redemption index.
In particular, we consider two treatment cases: the municipalities of the former
redemption index higher than 18 % and those higher than 20 %. We do so because
the criterion of the new redemption index for the limitation group is 18 %; the
municipalities with indexes higher than 18 % under the former rule might react
after the new rule. Additionally, since the municipalities with indexes higher than
20 % under the former rule comprise both the limitation and the strict limitation
groups, they might react actively after the new rule.
The upper panel in Table 5 shows the results of the treatment group with the
former redemption index higher than 18 %. The number of the treatment group
is 44 municipalities while that of the control group is 1,732 municipalities. The
results are similar to our main results of the targeted indexes shown in Table 2,
but the treatment groups for each year of the balance index are larger than those
of our main results. Those of the consolidated balance index are larger. The
treatment groups of the redemption index are negatively estimated, except for the
redemption index in FY2008, and the values are larger than our main results in
the absolute value. Similarly, the treatment groups of the future burden index are
statistically significantly negative, and those coefficients are larger than our main
results in the absolute value. For the fund index, the treatment group in FY2009
is statistically significantly positive. In particular, the treatment groups of the
money index are positively estimated, and those coefficients are quite larger than
our previous results. The coefficients each year are 8.18, 23.03, and 22.94 JPY per
capita (approximately 80, 230, and 229 USD, respectively).
The lower panel in Table 5 shows the results of the treatment group with the
former redemption index higher than 20 %. The number of the treatment group
is 18 municipalities, while that of the control group is 1,758 municipalities. The
treatment groups of the balance index each year are not statistically significant.
On the other hand, those of the consolidated balance index are statistically signif-
icantly positive, and the coefficients are larger than the previous results. Both the
redemption and the future burden indexes yield similar results, but those coeffi-
cients are larger than our main results. Thus, the municipalities that were in the
limitation groups of bond issuance improved their redemption and future burden
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indexes. Additionally, the treatment groups of the fund index are not statistically
significant. However, those of the money transfer index are positively estimated,
and the coefficients are the largest in our estimation. Although the treatment group
improved their targeted indexes, except for the balance index, they clearly increased
their money transfers to the public enterprise accounts.
As a result, we reveal that the caution group under the former fiscal rule, when
the former redemption index ranged from 15 % to 20 %, implemented creative
accounting by increasing the money transfers to improve the targeted indexes.
5.3.3 Placebo treatment period
Third, we formally test for the common trend assumption for our main outcomes
of interest using both placebo outcome variables and placebo treatment periods.
However, we cannot obtain the new fiscal indexes before the introduction of the
new fiscal rule. To check the common trend assumption between the treatment
and the control groups in the pretreatment period, we apply the former balance,
the fund, and the money transfer indexes as the placebo outcome variables. In
particular, that is the reason why the former balance index is almost same as the
balance index.
Table 6 reports the estimation results in the placebo treatment periods. To
focus the analysis in the placebo treatments, we use only 2 control and 2 treatment
period years, which are the data between FY2004 and FY2005. We do so because
the number of the municipalities rapidly decreases from approximately 3,200 to
1,820 in the period and we cannot calculate the fiscal indexes. The placebo DID
estimation of the former balance, the fund, and the money transfer indexes can
statistically confirm the common pre-trend assumption. We can observe that the
treatment groups of the former balance, the funds and the money transfer indexes
are statistically not significant. Therefore, we reveal that the treatment group
increases their money transfers to public enterprises after the introduction of the
new fiscal rule while improving their targeted indexes.
6 Discussion
Based on the results from Tables 2 to 6, our main results in Tables 2 and 3 are
consistent with the creative accounting implemented under the new fiscal rule.
Thus, the treatment group, which faces a large former redemption index, engaged
in creative accounting by using money transfers from the ordinary accounts to the
public enterprise accounts after the introduction of the new fiscal rule.
One of the purposes of introducing the new fiscal rule was to improve municipal
fiscal conditions, including those of extra-governmental organizations. Our results
suggest that the new fiscal rule improves the new fiscal indexes without the stock-
flow adjustments under the new fiscal rule. On the other hand, we conclude that
the treatment group, which suffered from a large redemption index in the former
rule, implements creative accounting under the rule by using a combination of
the improvement of the targeted indexes and the deterioration of the untargeted
indexes. This phenomenon is not an illegal behavior, but it is a postponing behavior
of the fiscal improvement to avoid punishments under the new fiscal rule. Thus, to
evaluate the new fiscal rule, we should check not only the targeted indexes but also
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the untargeted indexes, which indicate the true fiscal conditions.
In Japan’s case, we consider that the increase in the money transfers to public
enterprises is caused by the difference between regulated and non-regulated enter-
prises due to the different governance systems. Public enterprises number 9,210
groups in FY2007. The breakdown shows that regulated enterprises number 2,880
groups, but non-regulated enterprises number 6,330 groups in FY2007. Although
the consolidated balance and the future burden indexes include some parts of the
money transfers to public enterprises, neither their transparency nor their account-
ability are sufficient.
For example, a part of the future burden index consists of the estimated amount
of the money transfers from the ordinary accounts to the public enterprise accounts,
but the detailed formula for the estimated amount of the money transfers is not
disclosed in the guideline to the formula of the future burden index. The same
problems occur in the guideline of the formula of the new fiscal indexes. Addition-
ally, non-regulated enterprises are weakly monitored by the central government.
Therefore, in future research, we must obtain more detailed data, including from
each public enterprise, to reveal these points.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we contribute to the literature in several ways. We analyze the
use of creative accounting after the introduction of the new fiscal rule in Japan’s
municipalities. In particular, we focus on the institutional change between the
announcement and the enforcement of the new fiscal rule. Our primary contribution
is that we identify the causal effects of the new fiscal rule focused on the use of
creative accounting by applying the DID method.
We clearly reveal that the municipalities with a large redemption index in the
former rule improve these new indexes by increasing money transfers from the
ordinary accounts to the public enterprise accounts. This finding occurs because
the amount of the money transfers does not have the strict criterion of the new fiscal
rule. The municipalities, which had a large former redemption index just before the
introduction of the new fiscal rule, manipulate their fiscal indexes through money
transfers within the new fiscal rule due to a large amount of accumulated debt in
public enterprises. Therefore, we find that the municipalities engage in creative
accounting by stock-flow adjustments within the new fiscal rule.
We believe that the municipalities myopically postpone improving their fiscal
problems even though the aim of introducing the new fiscal rule is to achieve true
fiscal soundness and to prevent creative accounting such as stock-flow adjustments.
Given that a number of the municipalities depend on a large number of grants from
the central government and that they have a large amount of accumulated debt, we
conclude that the municipalities engage in creative accounting by increasing their
money transfers. They do so because they do not want to be managed fiscally under
the control of the central government. Furthermore, our findings serve as evidence
that the municipalities postpone improving their true fiscal conditions.
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Figure 3: Image of the early financial soundness, the financial rebuilding and the
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Notes: For the purpose of comparison between the former and the new fiscal
rules, the Figure adds the criterion of the former balance index.
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Financial building stage 
(Red card)
Notes: In the new fiscal rule, the municipalities with the redemption index of
18 % or more require permission to issue local bonds from the Minister of Internal
Affairs and Communications. The “strict limitation” group means that the munic-
ipalities are prohibited from the bond issuance of both original and commissioned
projects by the upper government except for disaster recovery projects.
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Notes: The targeted indexes (balance, consolidated balance, redemption, and
future burden) are the ratios of the standard financial scale. The untargeted indexes
(fund and money transfer) are the per capita expenditure.
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Notes: The targeted indexes (balance, consolidated balance, redemption, and
future burden) are the ratios of the standard financial scale. The untargeted indexes
(fund and money transfer) are the per capita expenditure.
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Table 1: Summary statistics in FY2007
Control Treatment
Number of observations 1581 195
Mean Mean Mean Diff
Outcome variables
Balance 4.594 3.155 1.439***
Consolidated balance 15.131 9.579 5.552***
Redemption 13.75 20.408 -6.658***
Future burden 93.928 153.663 -59.735***
Fund (thousand per capita) 179.513 237.936 -58.423**
Money transfer (thousand per capita) 59.993 76.618 -16.624***
Pop. (thousand) 66.098 64.900 1.524
Pop. 15 0.133 0.126 0.008***
Pop. 65 0.256 0.298 -0.042***
Merged trend 1.106 1.133 -0.023
Designated cities 0.008 0.026 -0.018**
Core cities 0.021 0.005 0.016
Special-case cities 0.021 0.000 0.021**
Primary ind. 12.157 16.753 -4.603***
Secondary ind. 28.352 24.807 3.521***
Area 202.674 241.082 -38.408**
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The area is used as the predetermined covariates.
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Table 2: Estimation results for the targeted indexes
VARIABLES Balance Consolidated balance
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Treatment 2008 0.752*** 0.779*** 0.627*** 1.311*** 1.279*** 1.111***
[0.172] [0.171] [0.171] [0.401] [0.399] [0.397]
Treatment 2009 1.120*** 1.110*** 0.889*** 2.240*** 2.233*** 2.044***
[0.252] [0.250] [0.255] [0.562] [0.556] [0.566]
Treatment 2010 1.663*** 1.650*** 1.541*** 2.660*** 2.653*** 2.747***
[0.352] [0.350] [0.348] [0.699] [0.688] [0.689]
Constant 4.400*** -4.417 9.449 14.485*** 17.323 61.180*
[0.039] [5.286] [10.649] [0.089] [24.242] [32.636]
Observations 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880
R-squared 0.134 0.139 0.150 0.084 0.093 0.110
Number of code 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776
Covariates No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates × Year No No Yes No No Yes
VARIABLES Redemption Future burden
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Treatment 2008 -0.115 -0.248*** -0.071 -7.452*** -8.907*** -6.080***
[0.075] [0.081] [0.076] [1.389] [1.467] [1.375]
Treatment 2009 -1.060*** -1.054*** -0.869*** -17.500*** -17.260*** -12.916***
[0.131] [0.131] [0.125] [2.009] [1.999] [1.912]
Treatment 2010 -2.039*** -2.026*** -1.638*** -25.410*** -25.052*** -18.357***
[0.215] [0.214] [0.200] [2.616] [2.594] [2.466]
Constant 14.490*** 11.431*** 8.618 100.649*** 444.613*** 432.199**
[0.026] [4.277] [8.329] [0.435] [129.996] [169.877]
Observations 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880
R-squared 0.454 0.464 0.511 0.548 0.555 0.595
Number of code 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776
Covariates No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates × Year No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All models control for the covariates, the time-invariant fixed effects of the munici-
palities, the year fixed effects, and the interaction term between the predetermined
covariates and the year fixed effects.
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Table 3: Estimation results for the untargeted indexes
VARIABLES Fund Money transfer
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Treatment 2008 7.550** 15.224*** -0.956 4.306*** 4.877*** 3.947**
[3.084] [3.817] [3.230] [1.452] [1.403] [1.643]
Treatment 2009 25.968*** 24.934*** 3.235 8.509*** 8.637*** 6.322***
[7.280] [7.304] [6.678] [1.932] [1.999] [2.110]
Treatment 2010 48.257*** 46.719*** 6.529 8.867*** 9.002*** 7.235***
[11.278] [11.258] [9.794] [1.939] [2.045] [2.293]
Constant 188.109*** -19.241 -223.356 62.140*** -197.200*** 22.833
[1.343] [171.607] [590.877] [0.426] [40.720] [276.109]
Observations 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880
R-squared 0.163 0.187 0.358 0.046 0.053 0.080
Number of code 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776
Covariates No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates × Year No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All models control for the covariates, the time-invariant fixed effects of the munici-
palities, the year fixed effects, and the interaction term between the predetermined
covariates and the year fixed effects.
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Table 4: Sample of Yubari city
Sample with Yubari city
VARIABLES Balance Consolidated balance Redemption Future burden Fund Money transfer
Treatment 2008 0.772*** 1.274*** -0.042 -6.329*** -1.139 3.901**
[0.231] [0.432] [0.081] [1.392] [3.232] [1.644]
Treatment 2009 4.372 5.567 -0.856*** -13.379*** 2.855 6.673***
[3.471] [3.545] [0.125] [1.959] [6.672] [2.131]
Treatment 2010 5.066 6.312* -1.586*** -19.490*** 6.227 7.144***
[3.518] [3.606] [0.205] [2.703] [9.758] [2.282]
Constant 81.044 133.676* 9.350 417.247** -231.691 26.692
[72.883] [80.813] [8.356] [170.243] [590.136] [275.678]
Observations 6,884 6,884 6,884 6,884 6,884 6,884
R-squared 0.026 0.033 0.506 0.592 0.358 0.081
Number of code 1,777 1,777 1,777 1,777 1,777 1,777
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All models control for the covariates, the time-invariant fixed effects of the munici-
palities, the year fixed effects, and the interaction term between the predetermined
covariates and the year fixed effects.
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Table 5: Robustness checks with different treatments
The former redemption index higher than 18 %
VARIABLES Balance Consolidated balance Redemption Future burden Fund Money transfer
Treatment 2008 1.328*** 3.026** 0.045 -9.191** 9.506 8.184**
[0.413] [1.324] [0.240] [3.739] [8.734] [3.315]
Treatment 2009 1.367** 5.277*** -1.115*** -20.296*** 37.403* 23.026***
[0.546] [1.767] [0.384] [5.046] [20.878] [6.421]
Treatment 2010 2.089** 6.869*** -2.049*** -25.759*** 40.938 22.943***
[0.839] [2.000] [0.608] [6.312] [28.482] [6.344]
Constant 5.810 55.032* 11.719 477.098*** -223.604 5.288
[10.629] [32.653] [8.438] [170.555] [589.702] [273.185]
Observations 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880
R-squared 0.145 0.117 0.496 0.590 0.360 0.088
Number of code 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The former redemption index higher than 20 %
VARIABLES Balance Consolidated balance Redemption Future burden Fund Money transfer
Treatment 2008 1.035 2.644** -0.090 -18.017*** 9.959 12.426**
[0.636] [1.139] [0.389] [5.315] [16.262] [5.876]
Treatment 2009 1.374 6.575** -1.392* -32.334*** 62.895 31.622***
[0.941] [2.699] [0.761] [8.671] [43.334] [11.645]
Treatment 2010 1.797 8.328*** -2.633** -39.635*** 63.224 28.096***
[1.341] [2.761] [1.223] [11.801] [59.121] [8.263]
Constant 5.163 53.013 12.225 484.192*** -235.928 -1.834
[10.758] [32.576] [8.336] [170.508] [587.769] [273.338]
Observations 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880 6,880
R-squared 0.142 0.111 0.492 0.590 0.360 0.084
Number of code 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All models control for the covariates, the time-invariant fixed effects of the munici-
palities, the year fixed effects, and the interaction term between the predetermined
covariates and the year fixed effects.
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Table 6: Placebo tests
VARIABLES Former balance Fund Money transfer
Placebo treatment -0.029 -0.925 0.511
[0.189] [4.655] [1.657]
Constant 4.061 313.988*** 94.930**
[4.165] [81.869] [38.257]
Observations 3250 3259 3258
R-squared 0.026 0.024 0.068
Number of code 1779 1779 1779
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Covariates × Year Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All models control for the covariates, the time-invariant fixed effects of the munici-
palities, the year fixed effects, and the interaction term between the predetermined
covariates and the year fixed effects.
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A Outline of the new fiscal indexes
• Deficit index (Balance index in this paper)
Deficit =
Real deficit of ordinary accounts
Standard financial scale
– Real deficit of the ordinary accounts: Amount of real deficit in account
corresponding to ordinary account among the general and special ac-
counts
∗ Amount of real deficit = amount of advanced appropriation + (amount
of deferred payment + amount of business balance carried forward)




– Consolidated real deficit: If the total amount of 1 and 2 exceeds the total
amount of 3 and 4, such exceeding amount
∗ 1. Among the general and special accounts excluding public enter-
prises (enterprises regulated and enterprises not regulated by the
Local Public Enterprise Law), the total amount of real deficit of the
accounts subject to real deficit
∗ 2. Among the special accounts of public enterprises, the total amount
of deficit of funds of the accounts subject to deficit of funds
∗ 3. Among the general and special accounts excluding public en-
terprises, the total amount of real balance surplus of the accounts
subject to real balance surplus
∗ 4. Among the special accounts of public enterprises, the total amount
of surplus of funds of the accounts subject to surplus of funds
• Redemption index
Redemption =
(A + B) − (C + D)
Standard financial scale − D
– A: Redemption of principal and interest of bonds
– B: Quasi-redemption of principal and interest
B is the total amount of 1 to 5
∗ 1: Amount corresponding to the annual redemption of principal in
a case of principal equal amortization where the redemption period
is 30 years regarding bullet bonds
∗ 2: Among the transfers from the general accounts, etc. to the special
accounts other than the general accounts, etc., the amount acknowl-
edged to be appropriated for revenue resources for the redemption
of public enterprises bonds
∗ 3: Among the burdens and subsidies to associations/local develop-
ment corporation, the amount acknowledged to be appropriated for
revenue resources for the redemption of bonds issued by the associ-
ations, etc.
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∗ 4: Expenditure based on liabilities that can be treated similarly to
debt service among the expenditure based on the debt burden
∗ 5: Interest on a temporary loan
– C: Special revenue resources
– D: Amount included in the standard financial requirements pertaining
to the redemption of principal and interest and the quasi-redemption of
principal and interest
• Future burden index
Future burden =
Future burden − (A + B + C)
Standard financial scale − D
– Future burden: Total amount of 1 to 8
∗ 1: Outstanding bonds as of the end of the fiscal year previous to the
relevant fiscal year of the general accounts, etc.
∗ 2: Expected amount of expenditure based on the debt burden (those
pertaining to the expenses of each item under Article 5 of the Local
Finance Law)
∗ 3: Estimated amount of the transfer from the general accounts, etc.,
to be appropriated to the redemption of the principal of bonds of
the accounts other than the general accounts, etc.
∗ 4: Estimated amount of the burden, etc., of the local government
concerned to be appropriated for the redemption of the principal
bonds of the associations, etc., of which the local government con-
cerned is a number
∗ 5: Among the expected amount of the retirement allowance to be
paid (amount of the allowance that will be paid to all employees at
the term end), the estimated amount of the burden of the general
accounts, etc.
∗ 6: Among the amount of debts of certain corporations established
by the local government and among the amount of the debt burden
in the case of bearing the debts for such certain corporations, the
estimated amount of the burden of the general accounts, etc., con-
sidering the financial and business condition of such corporations,
etc.
∗ 7: Consolidated real deficit
∗ 8: Among the amount corresponding to the consolidated real deficit
of the associations, etc., the estimated amount of the burden of the
general accounts, etc.
– A: Amount of appropriable funds
∗ Funds under Article 241 of the Local Autonomy Law that can be
appropriated for the amount of redemption, etc., of 1 to 6
– B: Estimated amount of special revenue sources
– C: Amount expected to be included in standard financial requirements
pertaining to outstanding local government bonds, etc.
– D: Amount included in standard financial requirements pertaining to
the redemption of principal and interest and the quasi-redemption of
principal and interest
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